Admiral Stansfield Turner

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U.S. Naval Academy

ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Admiral McKee, members of the Brigade of Midshipmen, ladies and gentlemen.

I happen to have been a great admirer of James Forrestal. I happen to be personally indebted to him for something he did on my behalf. I am very honored to be able to speak in this series named for him.

Beyond that, beyond my friendship for your Superintendent and his persuasiveness, I am here also tonight because I feel obliged to be here. When I was in your shores, we used to have Wednesday night lectures for First Class Midshipmen, and I, as you tonight, used to go voluntarily and with enthusiasm.

[Laughter]

But as I look back, all of those involuntary trips to then-Mahan Hall paid off for me because of one lecture. This was a lecture by a professor from Harvard University named William Y. Elliott. He spoke to us one Wednesday night in the fall of 1945 about a trip he'd just made to the Soviet Union, just after World War II. The only facts I remember of what he told us was that they delayed him, contrived a way to delay him at the border of the Soviet Union for six or seven hours while they searched his baggage, every corner of it.

Now, 32 years later, that's an irrelevant fact to remember, and it was not, of course, the facts of Professor Elliott's lecture that impressed me. It was the clear reasoning behind it. It was the fact that here was a man who posed questions, didn't just express opinions, and then explored the various hypotheses and alternatives which could supply the most logical, persuasive answers to

those questions.

I sat where you're sitting, and I was frankly dissatisfied intellectually. I was learning a lot of facts here at the Naval Academy: entropy, differential equations, lots of other thrilling things. But my sense of inquisitiveness, my wanting to know why, why I was studying this and why it was important, was not being satisfied.

I left Mahan Hall that night with a crystal-clear objective in mind. I wanted to become a Rhodes Scholar and go to Oxford University, only because William Y. Elliott had been introduced as a Rhodes Scholar, and I wanted to emulate his method of thinking.

That lecture and my subsequent education at Oxford left a permanent mark on me for which I am very grateful. And hence I am here tonight out of a sense of obligation to this lecture series, in its previous title, and to Professor Elliott.

Now, I'm not going to tell you that I think 4000 of you should apply to go to Oxford. That hardly would be sensible or feasible. But what I would like to suggest to you is that the kind of thinking which William Y. Elliott epitomized to me is the kind which I believe, by thinking problems through in depth, exploring all the possible alternatives, will make your lives more rich, more successful, and more productive.

If I could describe what I'm talking about, it's an enthusiasm which this professor reflected for probing very deeply, for weighing all the possible answers carefully and sucessively until you come up with that which is most likely, most persuasive, most reasonable.

So I would suggest tonight that the most value you will get out of your education here and any subsequent education, be it formal academic or just acquisition of knowledge by osmosis, the greatest value will not be the facts that you learn or the subjects that you study, it will be the habits of thinking and reasoning which you acquire, and the willingness and determination which you develop then to probe beneath the surface of things.

Let me illustrate what I'm talking about more concretely by giving you an example that came from my educational experience at Oxford.

Can you still hear me in the back?

One day I was meeting with my philosophy tutor, one-on-one; and he looked at me and he said, "Turner, do you tell the truth?"

I said, "Yes, of course."

He said, "Do you always tell the truth?"

I said, "Yes, sir."

He said, "Imagine yourself standing on a street corner, and a man comes running by at full speed, turns the corner and goes down that way, shouting to you as he goes by, 'They're trying to kill me. They're trying to kill me.' And about 30 seconds later another man comes by, as you stand there wondering what this is all about, and he has a gun in his hand. And he runs up to you and he says, 'Which way did he go?'"

My professor looked at me and he said, "Turner, do you tell the truth?"

Well, the point of this simile is that you must understand why you tell the truth. I think we tell the truth because it is essential to the fabric of our society. You simply cannot have an organized society if you can't trust the majority of the things the other people say.

But does that mean you tell the truth to a murderer? That is, if this man with a gun was not a policeman. Does it mean you tell the truth under every circumstance. People like murderers are trying to tear down the fabric of our society, not to build it up. Perhaps -- perhaps they deserve a lie.

Now, it may be heresy, here in the halls of the Naval Academy, where you have a code of conduct, where you are dedicated, as we all are in the Navy, to being honorable and truthful, to suggest that on some occasions you might want to lie. But I would also suggest to you that I have two Naval Academy classmates who will go down in the annals of this educational institution as two of our greatest heroes because they lied. They lied for 7 1/2 years as they were tortured as prisoners of war in North Vietnam.

So I suggest to you don't wait until you're on that street corner, don't wait until you are a prisoner of war to understand why you tell the truth or why you do a lot of other things. Think it out in advance.

Now, I appreciate that I'm asking you to take a very introspective view of life, to sit back and calmly see what's going on around you and analyze it, and you're very busy, the demands on your time are great. You've got to get by that test tomorrow in order to be here the day after tomorrow.

But I assure you that when you leave here in a year or two or three, it's going to be the same. Because when you're a junior officer, the demands on your time are very heavy. When you're conning a ship at sea, there's a right way to do it and a wrong way to do it, and nobody wants you sitting up there philosophizing.

And when you're flying an airplane, there are laws of aerodynamics, and you'd better do it the right way or you'll end up in the drink. And when you're reactor officer on a submarine and all the signals read scram, you don't sit there and ask why. Yours not to reason why; yours to do as your told or get a bad fitness report.

[Laughter]

But seriously, nonetheless, I urge you to set out and to set a goal for yourself not to lose the bubble, not to fail to keep asking yourself why you are where you are and why you are doing whatever you're doing.

When does this class, the first class make their choice of service: submarines and aviation and so on?

MAN: [Inaudible]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Six weeks from now you first classmen will be deciding where you go inside the Navy, right? How many of you are likely to apply for aviation?

Good.

Now, all those of you who raised your hands, have you really thought through why you want to be a naval aviator? Have you really thought through not only -- not only that it means more money, not only that it's good training at Pensacola, have you thought about what you're going to do for the Navy in five years, ten years?

[Laughter]

Have you thought about what aviation will be like in ten or fifteen years, when you become squadron commanders?

Well, if you want to think about the future of naval aviation, why don't we look at the past. And the last example we have of aviation in combat was Vietnam. And I recollect that one of the major aviation challenges in Vietnam was to knock down the Thanh Hoa railway bridge in North Vietnam. And lots of you who are going to be aviators have studied that, and you know that we sent over 600 individual aircraft sorties against that bridge and lost dozens of airplanes and pilots in doing it, and we didn't knock it down.

And then all of a sudden, towards the end of the war -- and I'm talking Air Force and Navy here -- towards the end of the war we sent in a few airplanes. They didn't get in close, where they were subject to surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft fire; they stood off there with a new weapon called a smart bomb. And they lobbed it in, filled with semiconductors and minicomputers. It found its way to the target. It was smart enough to know where

it was, and that was it. We did it in, nothing flat.

Now, have you thought, if you're going into aviation, what that means to you in the future? Where are you going to be in this process? What's the role of aviation going to be? Are you just going to -- are you going to drive a hotrod fast plane in fast over the target? Are you going to stand off and lob these smart missiles in? Or are you going to ship back on the ship and control remotely piloted vehicles that'll do the job for you? What kind of a pilot do you think you're going to be to meet the needs of the Navy in the 1990s?

Now, much the same will be for those of you whom I'm sure will be applying for destroyers. You want to look back at history too, but for destroyers I would turn to a very major chapter in the history of the surface Navy, way back in the spring of 1945, the Battle of Okinawa. And what was there? What was introduced there? The kamikaze. And the kamikaze wreaked havoc with our destroyers and our amphibious forces.

And we forgot about the kamikaze for almost 20 years, until 1967, when the Egyptians, from a land base, launched a kamikaze at an Israeli destroyer called the Eilat, and they sank it. And we suddenly remembered that cruise missiles are kamikazes with miniconductors and minicomputers and semiconductors instead of a man. And the other difference is they're better and they're more numerous.

Now, if you were planning to go into destroyers, are you thinking about what that means in terms of the kind of preparation you're going to have to make to defeat that threat?

The antiaircraft guns at Okinawa weren't too successful. I don't know whether you think the guns and missiles today will take care of it, or whether you think you're going to have to become an expert in the world of electronic wizardry to defeat this kind of a technical, sophisticated system by being technical and sophisticated. But I'd suggest you ought to think about that and understand what it's going to mean to be a destroyer officer in the 1990s.

Now, of course there are those, like Admiral McKee, who will tell you that that all means everything will go below the surface. And I'm sure there are lots of you here who will apply to be submarine officers.

Now, what is that going to mean? Submarines, traditionally, are loners. They go out, single ships on patrols, sink a lot of ships or submarines, come home, replenish, go out and do it again. But what are going to be the needs for submarines in the 1980s and '90s?

The objective of a navy is to -- or, one of the objectives

is to get the army and air force across the sea, if necesary. Another is to get economic flow coming into this country in raw materials and going out in terms of manufactured goods. Another is to protect the naval projection of power forces, carriers or amphibious forces.

Now, how are the submarines going to do this in their traditional lone-wolf, stealthy operation?

First of all, a submarine can't do much at all about a guided missile coming in from an airplane. Secondly, I don't think a single submarine will be that effective in any sphere against opposition to a carrier task force, let's say.

So it looks to me life if you're going into submarines you're going to have to start thinking about a different kind of game -- teamwork. And if you have teamwork you have to communicate, and if you have to communicate you don't have the same stealth you did in the past. It's different.

Maybe I'm wrong in the way it's going to go, but I don't think it will be like the submarine operations of history. And I wonder if you're thinking about that.

And some of you will undoubtedly make the choice of the United States Marine Corps.

Anybody?

Semper fidelis.

Well, a Marine is an amphibian, and the essence of amphibious warfare is to concentrate a lot of force in a small area over a short period of time to make that dangerous transition from water to land. The thing that used to bother us were big-gun emplacements in turrets and revetments ashore, which we had to take out with aircraft and big naval guns.

But if we look into the near term, let alone the 1990s, the enemy doesn't need revetments and turrets. Today you can have two soldiers with a hand-held missile, and you can sit under the foliage and wreak havoc if an amphibious force comes too close to the shore.

So, you Marines had better do some thinking too. It may not be easy...

[Laughter and applause]

I met a thinking Marine one day.

[Laughter and applause]

And let's look at the bigger picture. Are you giving any thought to why we want a navy in the 1990s? Are we talking about the possibility of another prolonged war in Europe and another Battle of the Atlantic like 1917 and 1942? Or are we talking about another Vietnam and seven or eight years of air bombardment from the sea to the shore?

Now, when I was here the answer to that question was given to us by all the senior authorities by quoting Alfred Thayer Mahan. The purpose of navies was to control the seas, because Mahan said it at the end of the 19th Century, and he was Neptune's prophet, it was certainly true.

In point of fact, about the time Mahan was writing this, his concept of control of the seas, which was a total control, an exclusion of the enemy from the surface of the sea, was becoming totally obsolescent, by the advent of the submarine and the aircraft. But 50 years after that we were still being told that control of the seas was the byword, and there wasn't much questioning of it.

Now I challenge you tonight, I ask you what shibboleths are we, your seniors in the Navy, telling you today? Are you asking yourselves, "Are those old fogeys looking backward or forward"? Are you asking yourselves, "Where should the Navy really be going in the future"?

Now, I'm not suggesting there's not a good explanation for why we need a navy or for why we need aircraft, submarines, destroyers, and even Marines in it. What I'm suggesting is that the excitement, the challenge of military life is the constant change which we find around us, the change because of the differing world environment and the change because of the rapid pace of technology today. And the kind of navy we'll have in the 1990s will be dependent upon how well you think that through and anticipate what kind of a navy we should have, rather than letting events force change in the Navy.

And if that sounds like it's pretty ethereal and you're not going to be that involved in it, let me suggest that your ability to think through the kinds of problems I've been raising with you will have a very direct bearing on you. Becasue the role that you set out to play in the Navy, whether you join the submarines or the destroyers or the aviation or the Marines, may well not be the role you end up playing. Events may force you to adapt, to be flexible, to change.

Look at myself. Eight months ago I was the military commander of the forces of NATO in Southern Europe. Overnight, I was tasked into a basically civilian assignment as the Director of Central Intelligence.

Now, I have no specific training for this, and it's far too late to go take any kind of a course in intelligence. All I can do is rely on the experience I have had in destroyers, in the Pentagon, in other Navy assignments, in learning how to ask the right questions and how to demand the right alternatives so that I can make, hopefully, correct choices. The subject matter is new, the environment is civilian rather than military, but the same process of probing and asking questions applies just as much in my present civilian job as it did as a commander of military forces in the field.

Let me tell you about the first challenge I had when I became Director of Central Intelligence. One of my superiors came to me and said, "Turner, I've got a tough assignment for you."

"All right, sir."

He said, "I want to know whether there are any good golf courses in heaven."

So I said to my staff, "Where do we go to find out about intelligence on heaven?"

And first we went to the satellite people because we thought they might be close to the problem. Then we went to the signals intelligence people because we thought surely somebody would be communicating with the golf course. And finally we went to the spy people because we thought surely they could find out who was in touch with the golf pro.

But then, because I have been stressing to you tonight the use of alternatives, I appointed Team A and Team B to study this problem. And after a couple of weeks, Team A came back, and I said, "What's your answer?"

And they said, "We're very confident of our answer. There's an 87% probability that there are at least two good golf courses in heaven."

I said, "Great. That's fine. I know my superiors will be pleased with that.

"Team B?"

Team B said, "We agree wholeheartedly with Team A, but...."

And I said, "But?"

"But, Admiral, we have to tell you one other thing. Your first tee-off time is next Tuesday at 10 o'clock."

[Laughter]

Well, now, from the strength of your response to that supposed joke...

[Laughter and applause]

...I'm not sure whether you're in the same trouble as West Point or not.

[Laughter and applause]

Well, intelligence hasn't become -- hasn't become so esoteric that we can really probe to heaven. But much like the military, it is a rapidly changing environment today. And some of these changes will affect you directly as you go out into the operating forces of the Navy or the Marine Corps. Whether you're flying an airplane, conning a ship, driving a submarine, or barking at Marines, you're going to be dependent on good intelligence. And there are three ways that we try to collect intelligence for you:

We try to intercept signals in the air. We try to take photographs. And we try to send spies into the enemy camp. And let me illustrate the kind of probing and analytic thinking you have to do in order to employ these collection of intelligence assets so as to serve you, the operating people in the field.

Signals intelligence is a very important field and it's becoming increasingly potential. There's great opportunity today, because more and more signals are put on the air, communication signals, radar signals, beacons, all sorts of things.

For instance, if you make a telephone call in Washington, D.C. today, from one side of Washington to the other, there's a high probability that your call will go via a satellite 20,000 miles in the sky and back down again to go five miles across the city. That 40,005-mile trip provides lots of opportunities for interception. And so on.

But at the same time, the wizardry of semiconductors and minicomputers that I mentioned before gives everyone an opportunity to encode, encipher, deceive, put up deception in these signals so they will be unintelligible to somebody else.

[Cassette turned]

And yet we're talking today about spending billions of dollars to build new signals intelligence collection systems that won't be available for four or five, seven years. And today we've got to make a decision: Will that be worthwhile in five or seven years? Will it still be productive enough?

And much the same goes in the photo world. Our capability to take photos is increasing every day, but so too is a potential enemy's capability to thwart that.

It's the old game of offense and defense, and billions of dollars are in the balance.

Perhaps the only field of collecting intelligence that isn't up for grabs is the human field, the spies. They've been here since the beginning of history, and I think they'll go on for a long time.

But we do have a problem because our country is more conscious today than ever before of the ethics and the morals of the way our government operates. And, therefore, when we go into a spying operation, we have to weigh the risks more against the potential benefits.

And doing these trade-offs within these individual systems is very difficult, and doing the trade-offs between the three of them is even more difficult and requires a more penetrating analysis and comparison.

Signals intelligence can tell you a little bit about tomorrow because maybe you're lucky enough to be listening to the signal or the communication at just the right moment when somebody's telling something about what they're going to do. It's not easy. Photos can only tell you about today. Spies can overcome some of the disadvantages of the coincidence you need in signals intelligence, between listening and what's being said as to what you want to know, because you can direct your spy and tell him to go get what you want and don't bring home the extraneous material. But he may come back to you and say, "I really didn't have access to what you wanted, so here's a bunch of extraneous material."

So there are very complex choices to be made, and behind them all we must also ask ourselves what kind of intelligence will our country need in the 1980s and 1990s? Will the Soviets still be the big deal? Or, with a more interdependent world today than every before, will we want to concentrate on many other countries? Will military intelligence still dominate the intelligence scene, or are we more interested in energy and oil embargoes and population growth and grain and other economic or political factors? What will be the pressures on the United States? What will be the interests of the United States in a decade or two?

We can't complacently assume that today's objectives for collecting intelligence will be the same as tomorrow's. And if we do not think those through, we will be unable to attack the trade-offs I've been mentioning or the establishment of the right objectives.

So I'd like to say, in closing, if you're going to participate in the establishment of the right objectives for our country, for our Navy, if you're going to participate in the trade-offs that have to be made in all of the kinds of systems we have in the military and the intelligence fields, take Professor Elliott's advice. As I interpret that, it was: Be flexible. Be inquisitive. Concentrate on your ability to see the woods for the trees. Discern the alternatives and reject the superficial. And remember the words of Henry Ford: "The hardest thing in life is thinking. That's why so few people do it."

Give it a try. It'll be worthwhile and fun.

Thank you.

[Applause]

MAN: There are four microphones for anyone who wants to ask Admiral Turner any questions. They're located right there where the ushers are. And Admiral Turner will answer your questions.

ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't know if Admiral Turner will answer your questions, but he'll sure try.

MAN: Sir, you mentioned the question of whether or not we would be ready to fulfill the needs of the Navy in 1990. In view of our rather qustionable escapades in Vietnam in the last few years, do you feel that right now the Navy is meeting the demands that are being made on it, in the means of -- well, basically, are we equal to our enemies? Can the Navy survive. Or between now and 1990 do we play catch-up?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, I think -- the question -- can you hear the question in the back, or not? Okay.

It's my strong belief that, yes, we can meet the demands upon us today. I, as your Superintendent, have come back recently from the Mediterranean, where there's perhaps the most difficult combat potential situation for a navy: a small sea, lots of land around from which the enemy can launch air attacks as well as attack us from the sea.

It's my conviction that if we use the forces we have to best advantage, if we think through how we can fight them, how we can take the advantage of every opportunity we have, we can prevail. But I certainly would not say it's going to be easy, and I would not be complacent about it in any degree.

But we have the superior navy today, and I believe that we are rapidly evolving the kind of tactics we need to meet these difficult situations.

I'm -- I'm optimistic.

MAN: Midshipman Barth, sir.

I don't want to put you in a position that you can't answer, sir. But...

ADMIRAL TURNER: That won't be hard.

MAN: I mean -- well, whatever.

Recently the Israelis indicated that they would be amenable to including the Palestinians in the Middle Eastern peace talks. Can you tell us if our intelligence community was able to predict this change of position, and what sort of effects this has on our intelligence picture for the future of the Middle East area?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Did we predict the Israelis' willingness to have the PLO represented in the peace talks, and what does this mean for our future of intelligence?

We did not make a specific, concrete prediction on that. We have, rather, tried to lay out for our policymakers the alternatives that were available to the Israelis, to the Arabs in each of these situations and the factors which were pushing them in one direction or pushing them in the other. That's my preferred way of helping our policymakers.

If I can make a prediction out of that too, that's great. But no policymaker wants a simple intelligence officer to come along and say, "Boss, this is the way it's going to happen." He wants to know, "It may happen this way because these things are pressing the Israelis. It may happen that way because these things are pressing them in a different direction." And he can then make his own judgment on it, though I would likely say to him, "I favor this," or, "I favor that."

People usually criticize intelligence for not making express predictions, for not anticipating things that happen. We all like to do that, we all aim to try to be ahead of the game. But I don't feel that's the major value in what we produce. You've got to alert people over a long period of time to possibilities and give them some sense of weighing them against each other.

MAN: Sir, how do you interpret the CIA's rights to make political assassinations?

MAN: Could you repeat that?

MAN: Sir...

ADMIRAL TURNER: I got assassinations, but what else?

MAN: How do you interpret the CIA's rights to to commit political assassinations?

ADMIRAL TURNER: The CIA has no right to conduct any assassinations or to plan any assassinations, and that is proscribed by presidential directive. And we will not do it, have no plans or thoughts about it.

[Applause]

MAN: Sir, you said that it is all right to possibly not tell the truth when it defends somebody or in some interest. Well, where do you draw the line in, say, bugging somebody's telephone, or something like that? Would you tell that as a breach of civil rights, or is that agreeable when the situation calls upon it, sir?

ADMIRAL TURNER: We in the intelligence community do not break the laws of the United States of America. And the procedures under which any telephones are bugged or any communications are intercepted inside this country are laid out by law. And those laws are a compromise effected by the Congress and the President to protect, on the one hand, the rights and liberties of our citizens, and, on the other hand, the safety and security of our country.

And it is my job, as the head of the intelligence community, to insure that we comply with those laws precisely, minutely, and absolutely. And I am utterly confident we are.

MAN: Sir, Midshipman Saxon, Fourth Class.

There are indications that former CIA Director William Colby will be indicted for alleged crimes he committed while Director of the CIA. My question is: Do you believe he should be tried in open courtroom, with the possible implications of what may come out in a trial of a former CIA Director of the United States.

ADMIRAL TURNER: It's actually Director Helms who's being considered, who's been...

[Applause]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Sorry. Sorry, I didn't mean to embarrass you, but...

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: This is a very difficult and delicate point. There's no question that if Mr. Helms comes up for a public trial, we, the CIA, will have to release information the release of which will be damaging to the national security interest. And, therefore, a decision must be made by the Attorney General of the

United States as to whether the overall national interest will be furthered by prosecuting this case, if that is the recommendation of the grand jury -- and that has not come out and I don't know whether that is the recommendation -- or whether it would be better to waive the trial in order to preserve the secrets.

Now, I will not give you my opinion on that, because I'm involved in it, and I'm involved in it to this extent: that I feel a responsibility to advise the Attorney General and the appropriate authorities of this government of what I estimate the damage will be from the release of this information. But I am not in a position to weigh that outdistances the good that will be done by prosecuting if that were called for. That's someone else's bailiwick, somebody else's decision.

I have made my views known on what information would have to be released and how damaging it would be. Others have to make the decision.

MAN: Does the CIA have any intelligence concerning the Navy-Duke game this weekend?

[Laughter and applause]

ADMIRAL TURNER: I guess you do have a sense of humor.

[Laughter and applause]

ADMIRAL TURNER: Now, as for that bug I put in the Duke locker room...

[Laughter]

MAN: Sir, in light of the many instances that have come to light recently...

ADMIRAL TURNER: It's very hard to hear that microphone. Could you speak a little closer?

MAN: Sir, in light of the many instances that have come to light in the newspapers about CIA activities which are of questionable intelligence or legality, how would you determine the effectiveness of this, as a public information point of view, and how would you -- do you think it should be reported in newspapers, some of the things that might be detrimental to the intelligence community?

ADMIRAL TURNER: The question is: Should there be reporting in the newspapers of some of the past questionable activities of the CIA?

To begin with, the freedom of the press is one of the rock bedstones of our country and must be preserved. There's no question

that there are times when the press, in my view, goes to excesses in this. But I would be the last one in any way to suggest that anything should be suppressed from them. They must take the responsibility and make their own judgments on what they publish and what they feel they should withhold.

Now, the latest series of exposures about the CIA, from a public relations point of view, I expressly took to the public, to the Congress, because we uncovered documents indicating errors had been made 12 to 24 years to go, but the documents had been asked for four or five -- no, two or three years ago and had not been produced, through no one's fault; an error but an oversight. I don't believe it was deliberate. When I found them, it seemed to me the only honorable, the only true thing to do was to put them out. And I felt that it was better to do that than to have them leak out through what's known as the Freedom-of-Information-Act process, in which we'd have to have given them out over time anyway, and have a more sensational situation.

I went out, disclosed them, testified before the Congress, and we've taken our licks. But I do urge you to put in perspective that these were things done some years ago, and I assure they're not being done today.

MAN: Sir, what do you interpret as the Council on Foreign Relations' role in the American intelligence community and the Navy in years to come, sir?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I'm going to lecture at the Council on Foreign Relations in 10 days, and it's a very fine organization that helps to promote dialogue and debate within our country on foreign policy issues. But there is no official connection in any way between the intelligence community of our country and the Council on Foreign Relations, which is a totally private body. But I know that we do and will benefit by the studies they do, the magazine they publish, and interchange with some of their scholars.

MAN: Midshipman Kromal, sir.

In light of the, granted far long ago, Liberty and the Pueblo and recent Soviet satellite blindings alleged in the newspapers, has our intelligence-gathering capability been compromised or in any way restricted as to what it used to be, and have we acquired new means of acquiring intelligence which we haven't heard about yet which are making up for any losses we incurred because of these?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Every one of those types of incidents, where we lose important equipment, as we did with the Pueblo, where we lose important information, as we did with two young men on the West Coast who conducted espionage against a major industrial corporation that does business with the intelligence community just

recently, sets back our ability to collect intelligence, and costs you and me, as taxpayers, lots of money. That kind of information that gets into other people's hands makes it easier to do what I described here as taking countermeasures against our signals intelligence, taking countermeasures against our photography, and, of course, even compromising our spies if that kind of detailed information gets out.

I am very, very concerned today about the leak of secrets within our government, within our country. And it is a most injurious matter, not only for intelligence, but for the Navy and the Army and the Air Force and for all of us. And we must, each of us who are in the government, encourage higher standards of security. And I'm doing that in two directions today.

On the one hand, I'm trying to downgrade and declassify more intelligence information, so that it will help the public, on the one hand, but so it will reduce the amount of classified information and give us a greater sense of respect for what remains.

And secondly, I'm trying to tighten the controls over the very sensitive information, and have much tighter regulation of it. It's very essential to us.

MAN: Sir, has the Team A/Team B analysis, combined with the pass record of underestimation of Soviet military programs, prompted any change in the CIA's methodology for determining what their military programs are, sir?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Some. The Team A/Team B experiment ended up in a disaster because it went public and classified information got out and the debate got into the public forum. We are redoing that same study right now. And instead of a Team A/Team B, I have engaged a team of eight outside consultants to come in at different periods in the course of the study and review the work. And I've deliberately selected on that team people of the quality of Team A, people of the outlook of Team B, and others, so that we have a thorough mix of opinions. And if there is a strong opinion that we're underestimating, at least it will first be known to me before the estimate is finally approved; and, secondly, if it's a reasonable opinion, I will see to it it's expressed in the document. We will get the minority views there and make sure that the decision-maker understands that there is a difference of opinion.

MAN: Newspaper reports indicated that the Russian MIG-25 that landed in Japan had vacuum-tube avionics. Does the CIA consider his defection a hoax, along with the avionics; or do they consider it a first-line Russian aircraft and that is their state of technology, sir?

ADMIRAL TURNER: I have no evidence that it's a hoax or

that they tried to pull the wool over our eyes with this at all. And the equipment, including the electronics in the aircraft, in my personal opinion, fits the kind of technology we expect the Soviets to have. But I wouldn't underestimate that. It isn't always as sophisticated as ours, but the end product, done often with greater quantities, with more brute force, is frequently not far off from what we do in a much more sophisticated way.

MAN: Sir, do you feel, as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, that unification of the intelligence services should be a primary objective?

ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, that's a loaded question, maybe. The President in early August announced a step of what we call reorganization, some centralization, consolidation of the intelligence apparatus of our country, which gave me more authority over the budgets and the operations of our intelligence community, regardless of whether they're housed in the Depatment of Defense, the CIA, the Department -- I'm sorry. Primarily in the Department of Defense and the CIA.

I believe that there are two considerations about the consolidation, the centralization of authority in the intelligence world. We do two things in intelligence. We analyze and come up with estimates or predictions, and we collect information that you have to have to do those analyses.

In the collection field, as I stressed tonight, it's very expensive, and you don't want to have unnecessary duplication. And, therefore, central control is very desirable. It's also desirable because you want to make sure that with these different systems you're not underlapping, you're not failing to collect something of importance because one fellow didn't think of it and another fellow didn't think it either.

But on the side of estimating or analyzing, you want to have overlap and duplication -- as the question down here a minute ago, your question. You want to be sure that divergent opinions come forward, because no intelligence officer is omnisicent, and you want to be sure that you've got the State Department working primarily on political intelligence, the CIA working on political, economic and military, and the Department of Defense working on military and some economic, and you have that kind of overlap and interchange. It keeps the analysts stimulated, it keeps the policymakers from getting only one view, when that seldom is correct or seldom that clear that it's the right view.

So, we want some duplication in analysis, we want minimum duplication and maximum control in collection.

MAN: One final question in the back.

MAN: Midshipman Chavez, sir.

Sir, we're all aware of the Soviet -- the tension between the Soviets and the Chinese now. Are our intelligence resources good enough to predict and possibly prevent a nuclear exchange between these two countries that would certainly have an effect on the United States?

ADMIRAL TURNER: [Laughter] Yes, it would.

[Laughter]

ADMIRAL TURNER: I think I'd be honest with you and say if you're talking about predicting it some days or weeks in advance, no. I hope we might, but I wouldn't give you a high confidence in that, because a nuclear war doesn't take a lot of visible, detectable type of preparation.

Now, you assume that there would probably be some buildup in tension, and you would be alert to this and thinking aobut it. But pushing those buttons from relatively fixed forces, intercontinental ballistic missiles, doesn't have the requirement for a lot of warning signs that you would get for a normal conventional war.

So that's one of the more difficult tasks that you could give us. We hope we could meet it, but I wouldn't want to give you a high-probability guaranty.

[Applause]